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Federal Protections  
for “Fur-Babies”:  
A Legislative Proposal 
Abstract 
 
Americans love their animals, but America doesn’t protect them.  
Across the country, animals continue to be classified as mere prop-
erty, undeserving of any basic rights and unprotected by the animal 
welfare statutes that do exist, but often remain unenforced.  This 
Article proposes a comprehensive animal protection system that in-
cludes the following components: (a) general prohibitions against 
animal crushing, cruelty, neglect, and abuse; (b) a civil action pro-
vision that will allow humane society officers to investigate viola-
tions of those prohibitions; (c) a provision establishing animal legal 
advocates to work alongside the officers and prosecute violations; 
and (d) an animal-suit provision to grant abused animals standing 
to sue the convicted abuser for damages to pay for medical costs or 
other costs of care. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2017, a concerned neighbor found a victim of abuse starved and se-
verely emaciated, consumed by scabs, lice, infection, and frost bite, and suf-
fering from genital nerve damage and potential paralysis.1  The victim’s 
abuser pled guilty to misdemeanor neglect and was sentenced to community 
service.2  According to current laws, the abuser is not liable for damages, in-
cluding medical expenses or other costs of care, and will suffer no other crim-
inal or civil repercussions.3  Although the victim suffered a traumatic experi-
ence and serious medical procedures will exhaust his foreseeable future, he 
has no legal remedy and will only survive from the kindness and donations of 
others.4  The abuser is absolved from serious responsibility because the victim 
is a horse.5  The fact that the abuser was convicted and sentenced under an 
animal protection statute is actually quite an anomaly.6  Across the United 
States, the number of animal abuse cases prosecuted is miniscule compared to 
the number of reported animal abuse instances.7  The act of abusing an animal 
is not federally prohibited until the abuse causes severe bodily injury and af-
fects foreign or interstate commerce.8 
In stark contrast to the nation’s legal treatment of nonhuman animals,9 
Americans are more enthralled with their animal companions than ever be-
fore.10  In 2018 alone, Americans spent more than seventy-two billion dollars 
 
 1. Complaint at 4–6, Justice v. Vercher, No. 18CV17601 (Or. May 1, 2018) [hereinafter Justice 
Complaint]. 
 2. Oregon v. Vercher, No. 17CR36590 (Or. Cir. Ct. 2017). 
 3. See infra Section IV.C. 
 4. Justice Complaint, supra note 1, at 5–8.  
 5. See, e.g., id. at 9–10. 
 6. Symposium, Animal Advocacy and Causes of Action, 13 ANIMAL L. 87, 118–19 (2006). 
 7. Id. at 119.  For example, Massachusetts (as of 2003) only prosecuted about three percent of 
reported animal abuse cases.  See Jennifer H. Rackstraw, Reaching for Justice: An Analysis of Self-
Help Prosecution for Animal Crimes, 9 ANIMAL L. 243, 246 (2003).  According to Prosecutor Sara 
Swanson (Benzie County, Michigan), animal abuse cases “tend to be handled more out of the court 
system,” and even if the cases are thoroughly investigated, they are rarely sent to her office for prose-
cution.  Mardi Link, Animal Cruelty on the Rise, TRAVERSE CITY REC. EAGLE (Sept. 9, 2018), 
https://www.record-eagle.com/news/local_news/animal-cruelty-on-the-rise/article_73e5ee26-43c7-
5673-af11-aba74e892d5a.html. 
 8. Niraj Chokshi, There’s No Federal Ban on Animal Cruelty. Lawmakers Want to Change That., 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/30/us/animal-cruelty-bill-felony. 
html; see also infra Section IV.A (discussing the newly enacted animal cruelty prevention prohibition). 
 9. To be concise, this Article refers to nonhuman animals as “animals.” 
 10. See infra notes 36–38 and accompanying text. 
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on their pets, and that number is estimated to surge.11  Pet owners are also 
beginning to show more empathy for companion animals and pay more atten-
tion to the animal protection movements that have been working behind the 
scenes for decades.12  Animal rights organizations, such as the Nonhuman 
Rights Project, are vigilantly fighting to change the legal classification of an-
imals from property to legal persons in order to recognize that animals have 
rights in and of themselves.13  Animal welfare organizations are more willing 
to compromise to accept animal-related statutes that do not necessarily recog-
nize animal rights, but do provide immediate necessary protections.14  One 
such animal welfare statute, the Endangered Species Act, encourages citi-
zens—through a citizen-suit provision—to compel government enforcement 
of the protections contained within the Act to further protect animals.15  Un-
fortunately, the Supreme Court stripped the intended authority from the citi-
zen-suit provision by requiring that plaintiffs satisfy a strict injury-in-fact test 
before their case can be heard.16 
As seen in other areas of law, Congress may grant a private right of action 
to narrow classes of potential plaintiffs to circumvent the Court’s injury-in-
fact test.17  Before doing so, Congress should look to state animal protection 
statutes for guidance on building effective federal legislation.18  To set the 
stage for a federal legislative proposal, Part II of this Article recounts animal 
 
 11. See Press Release, American Pet Products Association, Americans Are Spending More on Pets 
Than Ever Before: $72 Billion (Mar. 21, 2019) https://www.americanpetproducts.org/press_re-
leasedetail.asp?id=191; Mickey Meece, American Families Spent Estimated $75 Billion on Pets in 
2019: Report, NY POST (Dec. 14, 2019, 11:27 PM), https://nypost.com/2019/12/14/american-fami-
lies-spent-estimated-75-billion-on-pets-in-2019-report/?utm_campaign=applenews&utm_me-
dium=inline&utm_source=applenews; Kerry Lengyel, American Pet Spending Reaches New High, 
VETERINARIAN’S MONEY DIG. (Mar. 24, 2018), https://www.vmdtoday.com/news/american-pet-
spending-reaches-new-high (discussing the almost seventy billion dollars owners spent on their pets 
in 2017). 
 12. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Animals as More than “Mere Things,” but Still Property: A Call for 
Continuing Evolution of the Animal Welfare Paradigm, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1031 (2016) [here-
inafter Cupp, Mere Things]; see also Stanley Coren, Why People Sometimes Care More About Dogs 
Than Humans, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/canine-
corner/201711/why-people-sometimes-care-more-about-dogs-humans. 
 13. See infra Sections III.A, III.B.1. 
 14. See infra Sections III.A., III.B.2. 
 15. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (2012); see infra Section III.B.2. 
 16. See Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572–74 (1992); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 
163 (1997); infra Section III.B.2. 
 17. See infra Section III.B.2. 
 18. See infra Part IV. 
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uses throughout history and illustrates America’s evolving attitude toward 
companion animals.19  Part III delves deeper into the differences between an-
imal rights arguments and animal welfare proposals and the fights for legal 
personhood or legal standing for animals.20  Part IV of this Article introduces 
a recent federal prohibition and samples animal protections from three states 
to provide a layout of what may or may not work in a more comprehensive 
federal system.21  Part V combines and adjusts the sampled state provisions to 
propose a four-part approach to potential federal animal cruelty legislation.22  
Lastly, Part VI concludes.23 
II. A HISTORY OF ANIMAL USE 
Humanity’s use of animals for food, clothing, transportation, etc. 
stretches back to the beginning of civilization.24  In the Old Testament, God 
tells humans to “[r]ule over the fish in the sea and the birds in the sky and over 
every living creature that moves on the ground.”25  Over 12,000 years ago, 
hunter-gatherer societies, true to the name, survived by hunting, fishing, and 
scavenging.26  Correspondingly, the classification of animals as human prop-
erty has origins in ancient legal systems.27  For instance, in ancient Rome, a 
person who captured a wild animal simultaneously secured property rights to 
that animal.28  Due to the immense value placed upon ownership of an animal 
 
 19. See infra Part II. 
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. See infra Part IV.  In November 2019, Congress enacted the Preventing Animal Cruelty and 
Torture Act to prohibit animal crushing.  See infra Section IV.A.  The three sampled states are Con-
necticut, Pennsylvania, and Oregon.  See infra Sections IV.B–D.  Connecticut allows animal advocates 
to assist prosecutors in cases concerning the custody or welfare of cats and dogs.  See infra Section 
IV.B.  Pennsylvania allows humane societies to privately employ officers who have authority to in-
vestigate and prosecute animal cruelty cases.  See infra Section IV.C.  Lastly, Oregon courts have 
determined that an animal can be classified as the victim of a crime.  See infra Section IV.D. 
 22. See infra Part V. 
 23. See infra Part VI. 
 24. STEVEN M. WISE, DRAWING THE LINE: SCIENCE AND THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 17–21 
(2002) [hereinafter WISE, DRAWING THE LINE]. 
 25. Genesis 1:28 (New Int’l Version). 
 26. Emma Groeneveld, Prehistoric Hunter-Gatherer Societies, ANCIENT HIST. ENCYCLOPEDIA 
(Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.ancient.eu/article/991/. 
 27. See Steven M. Wise, The Legal Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 471, 476–505 (1996) [hereinafter Wise, The Legal Thinghood] (explaining the characterization 
of animals through ancient Mesopotamian, Hebrew, Greek, and Roman civilizations). 
 28. Richard A. Epstein, The Modern Uses of Ancient Law, 48 S.C. L. REV. 243, 245 (1997). 
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in many ancient societies,29 legal remedies for destruction or theft of a per-
son’s animal were often intricate and precise, allowing collection of both com-
pensatory and punitive damages.30  For example, a section of the ancient Mes-
opotamian Code of Hammurabi31 explained different compensation schemes 
depending on whether the animal at issue was the property of an individual or 
an institution.32 
Centuries later, modern legal systems continue to classify animals as 
property although the relationship between many owners and animals has 
transformed.33  Similar to the circumstances in ancient civilizations, citizens 
of developing nations primarily use animals to provide for basic human needs 
such as food, transportation, or a source of income for impoverished people.34  
Accordingly, the consequences of reclassifying animals in a developing na-
tion are perhaps too dire to consider right now.35  In America, however, many 
 
 29. Cupp, Mere Things, supra note 12, at 1028 (“[F]or many ancients, animals may have been the 
most valuable property they owned.”). 
 30. Id. at 1028 n.9 (“If anyone uncovers a pit or digs one and fails to cover it and an ox or a donkey 
falls into it, the one who opened the pit must pay the owner for the loss and take the dead animal in 
exchange.  If anyone’s bull injures someone else’s bull and it dies, the two parties are to sell the live 
one and divide both the money and the dead animal equally.  However, if it was known that the bull 
had the habit of goring, yet the owner did not keep it penned up, the owner must pay, animal for 
animal, and take the dead animal in exchange . . . .  Anyone who steals must certainly make restitution, 
but if they have nothing, they must be sold to pay for their theft.  If the stolen animal is found alive in 
their possession—whether ox or donkey or sheep—they must pay back double.” (quoting Exodus 
21:33–36; 22:3–4 (New Int’l Version))). 
 31. The Code of Hammurabi is a set of 282 rules, proclaimed by the Babylonian King Hammurabi, 
who reigned from 1792 to 1750 B.C.E.  Code of Hammurabi, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Code-of-Hammurabi (last visited Oct. 27, 2019).  The Code was 
one of the earliest and most complete written legal codes and included commercial and judicial stand-
ards.  Id. 
 32. The Code of Hammurabi, AVALON PROJECT (L.W. King, trans.), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ 
ancient/hamframe.asp (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (“If any one steal cattle or sheep, or an ass, or a pig 
or a goat, if it belong to a god or to the court, the thief shall pay thirtyfold therefor; if they belonged 
to a freed man of the king he shall pay tenfold; if the thief has nothing with which to pay he shall be 
put to death.”). 
 33. See GARY L. FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION TO ANIMAL RIGHTS: YOUR CHILD OR THE DOG? xix 
(2000) [hereinafter FRANCIONE, INTRO TO ANIMAL RIGHTS] (providing statistics from the 1990s about 
owners’ attitudes towards their pets); see also Cupp, Mere Things, supra note 12, at 1029–30 (“Simply 
calling animals ‘property’ undervalues our evolving sense of their appropriate status . . . . Many of us 
tend to think of our companion animals as members of our families, and treating companion animals 
as property akin to a table or a chair would be odious to caring owners.”). 
 34. Cupp, Mere Things, supra note 12, at 1028–29. 
 35. Id. at 1029.  Richard L. Cupp, Jr. is a Professor of Law at Pepperdine Caruso School of Law.  
Id. at 1023.  As seen throughout this Article, Cupp writes and speaks extensively about the legal and 
moral status of animals and is widely recognized as a leading scholar within the field.  Id.  He argues 
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domestic animals are generally seen as companions and treated as part of the 
family, rather than a resource.36  Increased litigation throughout America 
seeking non-economic damages—such as punitive or emotional distress dam-
ages—for a tortious killing of a companion animal provides evidence that 
Americans consider their animals to be more than simple property.37  In addi-
tion to requesting recognition from the legal sphere for emotional attachment 
to their animals, pet owners spend record amounts of money to provide a 
happy life for their lovingly nicknamed “fur-babies.”38  In 2018, 79% of mil-
lennial, pet-owning homebuyers considered their pet’s needs before buying 
their home and said they would refuse an otherwise perfect home if the pet’s 
 
that: 
The implications of abandoning the property status of animals would be staggering, not 
only for fighting diseases and sustaining the economies of First World nations, but also, 
absent dramatic changes that do not seem likely in the foreseeable future, for the very sur-
vival of many people living at subsistence levels in the Third World. 
Id. at 1029.  Perhaps staggering changes in first-world nations are exactly the push needed in order to 
force market changes toward more sustainable and morally appropriate practices.  See id.  Negative 
externalities such as global warming, destruction of land, and animal abuse could be curtailed by first 
reclassifying animals in first-world nations, and only following in third world countries after new, 
sustainable practices have been developed and executed, thereby minimizing the effect on impover-
ished people.  Id. 
 36. FRANCIONE, INTRO TO ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 33, at xix; see also Richard L. Cupp, Jr., 
Focusing on Human Responsibility Rather Than Legal Personhood for Nonhuman Animals, 33 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 517, 526 (2016) [hereinafter Cupp, Human Responsibility] (“Most of us view the 
animals in our lives as in terms of affection rather than as financial assets.”); Maneesha Deckha, Vul-
nerability, Equality, and Animals, 27 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 47, 51 (2015) (“A good number [of indi-
viduals who live with animals] might even claim that their relationship with their companion animals 
is their most meaningful one.”). 
 37. See, e.g., Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 192–93 (Tex. 2013) (rejecting a claim for 
additional damages above market value of the companion animal); Kimes v. Grosser, 126 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 581, 582 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (allowing an owner to collect punitive damages for intentionally 
inflicted injury to a companion animal); see also Henry Mark Holzer, Harming Companion Animals: 
Liability and Damages, ANIMAL L. COALITION (Aug. 30, 2008), https://animallawcoalition.com/ 
harming-companion-animals-liability-and-damages/ (“[T]he overwhelming refusal of American civil 
courts to allow more than market value damages in the cases of veterinary malfeasance [or in cases of 
intentional harm] presents two main problems.  First, there is the equity, or fairness, issue: whereby 
human victims of veterinary negligence are not fully compensated for the emotional and financial 
investments made in their companion animals.” (quoting Christopher Green, The Future of Veterinary 
Malpractice Liability in the Care of Companion Animals, 10 ANIMAL L. 163, 192 (2004))). 
 38. Chris Lange, National Pet Month: Here’s How Much Millennials Spend on Their Pets, USA 
TODAY (May 22, 2018, 11:11 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/budget-
and-spending/2018/05/22/how-much-millennials-spend-on-pets/34900989/; see also Lengyel, supra 
note 11 (detailing the year-on-year increase regarding pet-related spending, which reached almost $70 
billion in 2017); Meece, supra note 11 (estimating $75 billion in pet-related spending during 2019). 
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needs were not met.39  In fact, many pet owners are so enthralled with each 
other’s animals (and their own, of course), that an industry of animal social 
media influencers is thriving and may even be compared to the influential 
power of some celebrities.40 
 
 39. See Diana Olick, Millennials Put Pets First When Buying a Home, CNBC (Aug. 31, 2018, 
10:36 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/31/millennials-put-pets-first-when-buying-a-home.html; 
see also Hillary Hoffower, Raising Kids Is So Expensive in America that Millennials Are Prioritizing 
Their Pets Instead and Dropping Up to $400 on Designer Dog Clothes, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 19, 2019, 
9:49 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/millennials-buy-high-end-dog-clothes-prioritize-pets-
over-kids-2019-3 (recognizing how many millennials are “treating their pets as if they were kids and 
devoting a growing share of their disposable income to them”); Rachel Lewis, Millennials Are Buying 
Homes Because of Their Dogs—Not Their Children or Marriages, MONEY (July 27, 2017), 
http://money.com/money/4876151/millenials-homes-dogs-children-marriages/ (“[A] third of millen-
nials who had already purchased their first home said they were influenced by the need to have space 
for a dog.”); Jennifer Liu, More Young People are Buying Homes That Cater To Their Dog’s Lifestyle, 
FORBES (Aug. 11, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/learnvest/2017/08/11/young-home-
buyers-are-moving-because-of-their-dogs/#716fabc11575 (“[A]s far as our companions, dogs had 
more weight in homebuying than any other human counterpart.”). 
 40. See Paula Froelich, Adoring Crowds Pounce on Celebrity Pets at PetCon in NYC, NY POST 
(Dec. 14, 2019, 4:54 PM) https://nypost.com/2019/12/14/adoring-crowds-pounce-on-celebrity-pets-
at-petcon-in-nyc/; Chavie Lieber, How to Make Your Dog Instagram-Famous, According to a Man-
ager for “Pet Influencers,” VOX (Nov. 6, 2018, 10:09 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-goods/ 
2018/11/6/18066056/dog-instagram-famous-pet-influencers; Nicole Spector, Social Media Users 
Post About Their Dogs Six Times Per Week, NBC NEWS (Jan. 19, 2017, 5:08 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/social-media-users-post-about-their-dogs-six-times-
week-n708751.  Many animal influencers use their vast followings to promote brands, sell their own 
products, or even land publishing deals for books or calendars.  The Top 15 Pet Influencers Whose 
Instagram Followings Speak for Themselves, MEDIAKIX, http://mediakix.com/2018/11/top-pet-influ-
encers-instagram-best-popular/#gs.1ukkh2 (last visited Oct. 27, 2019).  One such influencer, Doug the 
Pug (@itsdougthepug), caters to close to ten million followers across Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, 
and Snapchat and a has net worth of over $500,000.  Doug the Pug, ECELEBRITYFACTS (Aug. 15, 
2017, 12:49 PM), https://ecelebrityfacts.com/doug-the-pug-net-worth; Becky Hughes, Go Behind-the-
Scenes at Doug the Pug’s Nashville Home, PARADE (July 5, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://pa-
rade.com/583847/beckyhughes/at-home-with-doug-the-pug/.  Some pet owners and animal shelters 
work with “foster parents” who use social media accounts to bring awareness and raise money for 
shelter animals or animals that they are currently trying to find homes for.  See, e.g., The Misfits (and 
Candice) (@roofusandkilo), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/roofusandkilo/ (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2019); Noelani (@noelaniig), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/noelaniig/ (last vis-
ited Oct. 27, 2019).  For other fun or silly animal Instagram accounts, see Hamlet the Piggy (@ham-
let_the_piggy), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/hamlet_the_piggy/ (last visited Oct. 27, 
2019); Jill the Squirrel (@this_girl_is_a_squirrel), INSTAGRAM, https://instagram.com/this_girl_ 
is_a_squirrel/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2019); Juniper the Fox (@juniperfoxx), INSTAGRAM, https:// 
www.instagram.com/juniperfoxx/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2019); Leo (@leothegoldendoodle_), 
INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/leothegoldendoodle_/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2019); Lionel the 
Hedgehog (@LionelTheHog), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/lionelthehog/ (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2019); and Milo Minderbinder (@milotheminderbinder), INSTAGRAM, https://www.insta-
gram.com/milotheminderbinder/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2019). 
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Although the American population’s perspective regarding animals has 
changed, federal law has remained relatively stagnant.41  As of 2014, all fifty 
states have passed felony animal cruelty statutes for serious violations.42  
However, every state continues to classify animals as mere property, similar 
to a table or a chair.43  Until 2019, federal law prohibited recording acts of 
severe animal cruelty on video, but did not prohibit the acts themselves.44  An-
imal advocates, in one way or another,45 are leading the movement to reclas-
sify animals or enact greater protections for America’s beloved companions.46 
 
 41. Chokshi, supra note 8.  According to a 2015 Gallup poll, 32% of Americans believe that ani-
mals should be given the same rights as people.  Rebecca Riffkin, In U.S., More Say Animals Should 
Have Same Rights as People, GALLUP (May 18, 2015), https://news.gallup.com/poll/183275/say-ani-
mals-rights-people.aspx.  This is an increase from the 25% of Americans who responded this way in 
2008.  Id. 
 42. See Chris Berry, All 50 States Now Have Felony Animal Cruelty Provisions, ANIMAL LEGAL 
DEF. FUND. (Mar. 14, 2014), https://www.all-creatures.org/articles/ar-all-50-states-cruelty.html. 
 43. Wise, The Legal Thinghood, supra note 27, at 538 n.442. 
 44. Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act of 2010, 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2018).  In January 2019, Florida 
representative Ted Deutch introduced the Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture Act to impose a 
federal ban on animal crushing; the Act became law on November 25, 2019.  See infra Section IV.A; 
see also Chokshi, supra note 8. 
 45. Although most advocates fight for animals for the sake of the animals, the movement has 
grown to incorporate a fight to protect humans.  See Olivia S. Garber, Animal Abuse and Domestic 
Violence: Why the Connection Justifies Increased Protection, 47 U. MEM. L. REV. 359, 361–62 (2016).  
Many recent studies suggest that organized animal cruelty is generally a precursor or connected to 
other crimes, such as corruption, domestic violence, and child abuse.  See Animal Cruelty Facts and 
Stats, HUMANE SOC’Y U.S., https://www.humanesociety.org/resources/animal-cruelty-facts-and-stats 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2019).  One survey reports that 71% of domestic abusers target pets as well.  Id.  
Another study reported a finding of pet abuse in 88% of homes under supervision for child abuse.  Id.  
In 2016, the FBI began tracking animal cruelty crimes—along with everything else in their expansive 
criminal database—because animal cruelty is probably a precursor to more significant crimes.  Track-
ing Animal Cruelty, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.fbi.gov/news/sto-
ries/-tracking-animal-cruelty.  According to John Thompson, deputy executive director of the National 
Sheriff’s Association, “[i]f somebody is harming an animal, there is a good chance they also are hurt-
ing a human.”  Id.  A National Sheriff’s Association report included the following statistics: (a) animal 
abusers are five times more likely to commit violent crimes against people, (b) animal abusers are four 
times more likely to commit property crimes, and (c) animal abusers are three times more likely to 
have drug or disorderly conduct offenses.  Deputy and Court Officer, NAT’L SHERIFF’S ASS’N 1, 26 
(2014) (citing Arnold Arluke, Jack Levin, Carter Luke & Frank Ascione, The Relationship of Animal 
Abuse to Violence and Other Forms of Antisocial Behavior, 14:9 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 963, 
963–975 (1999)).  Therefore, protecting animals with more effective animal cruelty statutes that apply 
throughout the United States could ultimately protect potential human victims as well.  See, e.g., 
Charles Siebert, The Animal-Cruelty Syndrome, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 11, 2010), https://www.ny-
times.com/2010/06/13/magazine/13dogfighting-t.html. 
 46. See infra Part III. 
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III. ANIMAL ADVOCATES DIVIDED 
Animal advocates generally derive from one of two denominations—an-
imal rights theorists or animal welfare advocates.47  Although both types of 
animal defenders believe in reforming the legal structure concerning animals, 
the two parties disagree about fundamental aspects of how reform should 
manifest.48  Animal rights theorists argue that it is necessary to reclassify an-
imals and grant animals “legal personhood”49 to protect their interests.50  Wel-
fare theorists continue to believe in the “paternalistic solution of regulating 
[human] use of animals” and balancing human interests against appropriate 
animal treatment.51 
A. Animal Rights v. Animal Welfare 
Animal rights theory demands that animals be respected as valuable in 
and of themselves, rather than as a means to an end.52  These scholars argue 
that an animal welfare system—which requires balancing human interests 
against animal treatment—can almost never weigh in favor of the animal due 
to the animal’s status as human property.53  Because American legal systems 
traditionally aim to maximize and protect an individual’s property rights, a 
human’s property interest will almost always prevail over the interests of the 
property itself, which has no rights.54  Thus, recognizing that animals have 
rights, as animal rights theorists propose, is merely an instrument to protect 
animal interests.55 
 
 47. Daniel Davison-Vecchione & Kate Pambos, Steven M. Wise and the Common Law Case for 
Animal Rights: Full Steam Ahead, 30 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 287, 290 (2017). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Legal personhood refers to the concept of animals being granted certain fundamental legal 
rights such as bodily integrity or the right to be free from slavery.  See infra notes 79–91 and accom-
panying text. 
 50. Davison-Vecchione & Pambos, supra note 47, at 290. 
 51. Id. 
 52. GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 7 (1995) [hereinafter FRANCIONE, 
ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW]. 
 53. Id. at 4, 93 (analogizing animals to humans: “If one human is a resource of another, then that 
other human gets to value the interests of the resource in not suffering, and this valuation may be based 
solely on what will benefit the valuer and with absolutely no regard for what will benefit the valued.”). 
 54. Id. at 4–5. 
 55. FRANCIONE, INTRO TO ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 93 (“To say that my interest is pro-
tected by a right is to say that it is protected against being abrogated merely because such abrogation 
produces beneficial consequences for someone else.”). 
 [Vol. 47: 821, 2020] Federal Protections for “Fur-Babies” 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
831 
Animal rights theorists generally analogize the use of animals with human 
slavery.56  Simplified for the analogy, animal rights theorists propose the fol-
lowing premises: (1) every human has the most basic right to not be enslaved, 
because every human has an interest in avoiding suffering from being used as 
a means to another’s end—i.e. used as human property;57 and (2) all animals 
also have an interest in avoiding pain and suffering from being used as a 
means to another’s end—i.e. used as human property—and therefore, every 
animal should also have the most basic right to not be enslaved.58 
Animal rights theorists apply the philosophical principle of equal consid-
eration, which requires treating similar interests similarly, unless there is a 
morally sound reason for divergence.59  At the most basic level—where hu-
mans and animals are similarly sentient beings with similar interests in avoid-
ing pain and suffering—the difference in species is not a sufficient morally 
sound reason to recognize the fundamental rights of one, but not the other.60  
Therefore, according to animal rights theorists and the principle of equal con-
sideration, if American society recognizes human fundamental rights, it 
should equally recognize animal fundamental rights.61  However, most animal 
rights theorists agree that respecting an animal’s right to not be property does 
not mean that animals must be treated the same as humans for all purposes, 
or, for instance, that animals should be granted the right to vote or to attend 
school.62  Animal rights theorists argue that treating an animal as a legal per-
son does not mean that the animal is equivalent to a human, rather that the 
 
 56. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW, supra note 52, at 110–12 (“There were laws 
that protected slaves and that ostensibly gave ‘rights’ to those persons, but the laws were seldom, if 
ever, enforced or at all meaningful to the slave.  Although slaves were obviously people, the law 
treated them as ‘chattels,’ or as the personal property of their owners, rather than as persons.”). 
 57. FRANCIONE, INTRO TO ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 89, 92 (“The laws of almost every 
nation in the world prohibit chattel slavery, and the international community condemns slavery as a 
violation of basic human rights. . . .  [W]e must, at the very least, recognize that all sentient humans 
have an interest in not suffering at all as the result of their use as the resource[] of others.”). 
 58. Id. at xxviii, 81. 
 59. Id. at 82–84, 86–90.  The principle of equal consideration is found throughout moral theories 
and requires that moral judgments be universal, rather than based upon self-interest or the interests of 
a special group.  Id. at 82–83.  However, the principle does not require treating every creature the same 
for all purposes.  Id. 
 60. Id. at 99–100. 
 61. FRANCIONE, INTRO TO ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 100–02. 
 62. Id. at xxxi, 101 (“No one argues that we should extend to animals the right to vote or to drive 
a car or to own property or to attend a university, or many other rights that we reserve to competent 
human beings.”). 
[Vol. 47: 821, 2020] Federal Protections for “Fur-Babies” 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
832 
animal has morally significant interests and should not be treated as merely a 
resource.63 
Animal welfare advocates, on the other hand, assert that animals should 
be protected against cruelty and maltreatment,64 but that such protections 
should be based on weighing human interests (in using animals) against ani-
mal interests (in avoiding suffering).65  According to the World Organisation 
for Animal Health (OIE),66 “[g]ood animal welfare requires disease preven-
tion and appropriate veterinary care, shelter, management and nutrition, a 
stimulating and safe environment, humane handling and humane slaughter or 
killing.”67  This agenda prohibits unnecessary suffering, but allows humans to 
use animals as resources so long as the animals are treated humanely.68  In the 
United States, the Animal Welfare Act69—which sets minimum standards of 
animal treatment in research, commercial use, and entertainment—is a prime 
example of the responsibility granted to humans to ensure proper treatment of 
animals, even when they are classified as property.70 
Animal welfare advocates are further divided into two subgroups: those 
who believe that expanding regulation is a necessary step toward eventually 
ending animal exploitation, and those who believe that animals do not have 
rights.71  Animal rights theorists argue that progress within the realm of animal 
welfare cannot lead to real animal protection, because equal consideration of 
interests is impossible to achieve when animals are classified as property.72  
 
 63. Id. at 100. 
 64. Ralph A. DeMeo, Defining Animal Rights and Animal Welfare: A Lawyer’s Guide, 91 FLA. 
B.J. 42, 42 (2017). 
 65. FRANCIONE, INTRO TO ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 85. 
 66. On January 25, 1924, twenty-eight countries signed an international agreement to create the 
OIE, an intergovernmental organization.  What is the OIE?, WORLD ORGANISATION FOR ANIMAL 
HEALTH, http://www.oie.int/about-us/director-general-office/what-is-the-oie/ (last visited Oct. 27, 
2019).  The OIE currently consists of 182 members, including the United States.  The 182 OIE Mem-
bers, WORLD ORGANISATION FOR ANIMAL HEALTH, http://www.oie.int/about-us/our-members/mem-
ber-countries/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2019). 
 67. Terrestrial Animal Health Code, ch. 7.1, art. 7.1.1 (2019), http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/ 
eng/Health_standards/tahc/current/chapitre_aw_introduction.pdf. 
 68. DeMeo, supra note 64, at 44. 
 69. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159 (2012). 
 70. DeMeo, supra note 64, at 44. 
 71. Davison-Vecchione & Pambos, supra note 47, at 290. 
 72. Robert Garner, Animal Welfare: A Political Defense, 1 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 161, 168 
(2006); see also FRANCIONE, INTRO TO ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 33, at xxxi (“There is . . . no em-
pirical evidence that the regulation of animal exploitation leads to the abolition of exploitation.”). 
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Although animal welfare advocates in both subgroups73 recognize the philo-
sophical flaws in the argument for animal welfare (rather than animal rights), 
they view the fight for animal welfare as the more realistic battle at the mo-
ment.74  While it may be true that an animal’s property status is incompatible 
with a theory of animal rights, this incompatibility does not prevent animal 
welfare advocates from enacting basic protections for animals now.75  Accord-
ing to animal welfare advocates, it is imperative to remember that the law is 
generally a reflection of society, and a law-maker cannot stretch a policy much 
further than public opinion allows.76  Therefore, an animal welfare argument 
recognizes the need to negotiate with the government and encourage the leg-
islature to provide immediate protection for animals through compromises.77  
In addition to compromising for meaningful protections right now, animal 
welfare advocates campaign to expand the definition of unnecessary suffer-
ing, while strengthening the societal shift in perception needed to enact future, 
more expansive animal protections.78 
B. Legal Personhood v. Legal Standing 
Animal rights theorists generally advocate for reclassifying animals as 
legal persons—or perhaps into a separate category of a “living property”—in 
order to recognize that animals have inalienable rights and potentially bear 
duties within society.79  Animal welfare advocates are generally more willing 
to negotiate and compromise by accepting an animal welfare law that includes 
 
 73. The advocates who believe in taking smaller, more manageable steps toward animal rights rely 
heavily on the philosophical arguments within the animal rights movement, because their goal ulti-
mately aligns with the animal rights theorists.  See, e.g., Davison-Vecchione & Pambos, supra note 
47, at 290.  Advocates who do not believe that animals have rights still subscribe to the notion that 
animals should not be subjected to unnecessary suffering.  Id.  However, they do not believe that 
animal welfare laws should be used as steps in a larger movement toward granting animals rights.  Id. 
at 289–90.  For those advocates, enacting the animal welfare laws to prevent unnecessary suffering is 
the ultimate goal.  Id. 
 74. Garner, supra note 72, at 173–74 (“To others, including this author, it represents a realistic 
appraisal of what can be achieved now and in the short term, given the present vulnerable and arrogant 
state of the human condition.”). 
 75. Id. at 168. 
 76. Id. at 172. 
 77. Id. (providing an English example: “[T]he 1986 Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act offered 
better protection for animals than it might have otherwise done because a group of animal advo-
cates . . . were prepared to negotiate with government.”). 
 78. Id. at 169–70. 
 79. See Animal Advocacy and Causes of Action, supra note 6, at 95. 
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legal standing for animals in narrowly defined situations, which can protect 
animals now while society’s perception continues to evolve.80 
1. Current State of the Law: Legal Personhood 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a legal person as “[a]n entity, such as a 
corporation, created by law and given certain legal rights and duties of a hu-
man being; a being, real or imaginary, who for the purpose of legal reasoning 
is treated more or less as a human being.”81  The concept of legal personhood 
can be divided into two categories: natural persons and artificial persons.82  A 
natural person refers only to human beings, who obtain legal rights upon 
birth83 and are entitled to maximum legal protections.84  An artificial person85 
adheres to the dictionary definition, and refers to an entity that is granted some 
legal rights and protections similar to natural persons.86  Prominent examples 
of artificial persons are corporations and government organizations, however 
this category includes many other entities.87 
 
 80. See Garner, supra note 72, at 163. 
 81. Legal Person, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  Neither the Constitution nor the 
Supreme Court provides a definition of “person.”  See Jessica Berg, Of Elephants and Embryos: A 
Proposed Framework for Legal Personhood, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 369, 371 (2007). 
 82. Alexis Dyschkant, Legal Personhood: How We Are Getting It Wrong, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 
2075, 2079 (2015) (“The U.S. Constitution draws a principled distinction between natural persons and 
other legal persons, securing some rights for natural persons alone.”). 
 83. In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tection of “persons” extends to a viable or nonviable fetus.  410 U.S. 113 (1973).  However, the Court 
did not preclude states from classifying a fetus as a “person” so long as it was outside of the context 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections.  See Jeffrey A. Parness, Social Commentary: Values and 
Legal Personhood, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 487, 491 (1981).  The Court also recognizes that when states 
do enact protections for pre-birth forms of human life, it is generally contingent upon live birth.  Id. at 
493 (“[T]hat is, live birth triggers the retroactive vesting of rights upon the unborn.”).  Therefore, 
similar to animal welfare laws, which provide protection without granting legal rights for animals, 
state statutes generally protect pre-life forms, but do not grant them legal rights equivalent to a natural 
person.  Id. 
 84. Berg, supra note 81, at 373. 
 85. Also known as juridical or fictitious persons.  See id. 
 86. Id.  There are legal rights that are exclusive to natural persons.  See Dyschkant, supra note 82, 
at 2079 (“The Privileges and Immunities clause is limited to natural persons because they have ‘a more 
robust set of rights than all persons generally.’” (quoting Richard A. Epstein, Of Citizens and Persons: 
Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 334, 341 (2005))). 
 87. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (defining “person” to include “corporations, companies, associ-
ations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals”); Lawrence B. 
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Generally, a legal person is characterized as a bearer of both rights and 
duties,88 but the particular bundle of rights and duties that applies will vary 
depending on whether the person is natural or artificial and other factors 
within each category.89  Because of that variation, the concept of legal person-
hood is more of a spectrum than a bright line characterization.90  In a theoret-
ical hierarchy, natural persons would have precedence over artificial legal per-
sons.91 
Animals rights theorists propose a plethora of arguments focused on this 
spectrum theory of legal personhood to find a place on the spectrum for ani-
mals.92  For example, one argument challenges the fact that a human who can 
bear neither rights nor duties, such as an infant or permanently comatose in-
dividual, is on the legal person spectrum, while an animal continues to be pre-
cluded from the characterization.93  Another argument contends that a legal 
person need not bear rights and duties, but instead the definition should re-
quire merely a bearer of rights or duties.94 
 
Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1239 (1992) (“In admi-
ralty, a ship itself becomes the subject of a proceeding in rem and can be found ‘guilty.’”). 
 88. Dyschkant, supra note 82, at 2076 (“[T]he key element of legal personhood seems to be the 
ability to bear rights and duties.”); see also JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE 
LAW 27 (1909) (“[T]he technical legal meaning of a ‘person’ is a subject of legal rights and duties.”). 
 89. See Solum, supra note 87, at 1239.  A legal person usually has the capacity to own property, 
be a party to a contract, or to sue and be sued.  Id. 
 90. Carter Dillard, Empathy with Animals: A Litmus Test for Legal Personhood?, 19 ANIMAL L. 
1, 4 (2012) (“[L]egal personhood is a matter of degree depending on which rights and duties one has—
one can be more or less a legal person according to whether one is a prisoner, minor, parolee, proba-
tioner, future person, intending immigrant, corporation, animal, etcetera . . . .”); see also Dyschkant, 
supra note 82, at 2081 (“The law recognizes that children cannot be held as legally responsible as 
adults, and thus limits their rights and duties.”). 
 91. Berg, supra note 81, at 374 (“Our society was developed by and for natural persons, and thus 
legal rights focus on this group.”). 
 92. Dyschkant, supra note 82, at 2108 (“We may benefit from remembering that being capable of 
having rights and duties is not always a zero sum game, and sometimes more like a spectrum . . . .  It 
seems plausible that animals could also exist on this spectrum . . . .”). 
 93. See, e.g., Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Litigating Nonhuman Animal Legal Personhood, 50 TEX. TECH 
L. REV. 573, 578 (2018) [hereinafter Cupp, Litigating Legal Personhood].  Cupp refers to this as an 
“argument from marginal cases” and strongly opposes any argument that will compare a “marginal” 
human to an “intelligent” animal because of the negative consequences that could materialize from 
such a comparison.  Id.  But Alexis Dyschkant notes that this argument is relevant because it is evi-
dence of our illogical impulse to equate legal personhood with humanity.  Dyschkant, supra note 82, 
at 2080 (“[T]he tendency to equate legal personhood with humanity is so strong that it can lead law-
makers to declare humans to be persons that are incapable of exercising rights or owing duties and 
refuse to declare nonhumans to be persons that are capable of exercising rights and owing duties.”). 
 94. Steven Tudor, Some Implications for Legal Personhood of Extending Legal Rights to Non-
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According to a leading animal rights advocate, Steven Wise, “[o]nly legal 
persons count in courtrooms, or can be legally seen, for only they exist in law 
for their own benefits.”95  In contrast, Wise explains a legal thing can “exist 
in law solely for the sakes of legal persons.”96  Wise created an “Animal 
Rights Pyramid” to demonstrate the importance of obtaining legal personhood 
for animals.97  The base of the pyramid (level one) emphasizes the founda-
tional quality of the concept of legal personhood, which merely recognizes an 
animal’s capacity to possess any legal right.98  Level two then consists of the 
actual “legal rights possessed” by the animal, which may or may not include 
the right to sue or have its rights represented by a third party.99  If the animal 
has the capacity to possess a legal right (recognized in level one when an an-
imal is granted legal personhood), and actually possesses a legal right and a 
system of asserting that right, the third level asks if the animal “possess[es] a 
private right of action bestowed by statute, constitution, treaty, or common 
law.”100  According to Wise, an animal can only have standing in a judicial 
proceeding after the requirements of levels one through three are satisfied.101  
Because Wise believes that standing cannot be obtained without achieving 
legal person status, his foundation, the Nonhuman Rights Project, focuses on 
reclassifying animals as legal persons.102 
The Nonhuman Rights Project has filed a series of cases attempting to 
expand the definition of legal personhood to include animals, even if it means 
placing animals lower on the hierarchy than natural or artificial persons.103  
 
Human Animals, 35 AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 134, 137 (2010) (advocating for a status of “quasi” legal 
person for a creature that bears only rights without duties). 
 95. Steven M. Wise, Legal Personhood and the Nonhuman Rights Project, 17 ANIMAL L. 1, 1 
(2010) [hereinafter Wise, Legal Personhood]. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 2 fig.1. 
 98. Id. at 2 fig.1, 5. 
 99. Id. at 2 fig.1.  An animal may possess a legal right “with regards to bodily integrity or bodily 
liberty” even if the animal does not have the cognitive ability to understand or pursue a legal claim.  
Id. at 3. 
 100. Id.  For example, the Animal Welfare Act does not include any private right of action for 
violations, however the Endangered Species Act creates a private right of action for “any person [to] 
commence a civil suit on his own behalf” for violations of the Act.  See Animal Welfare Act, 7 
U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159 (2018); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (2018). 
 101. Wise, Legal Personhood, supra note 95, at 4. 
 102. Id. at 8–9. 
 103. See Litigation: Confronting the Core Issue of Nonhuman Animals’ Legal Thinghood, 
NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, https://www.nonhumanrights.org/litigation/ (last visited Oct. 27, 
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Many of these cases involve an animal, owned by a private party, confined in 
detrimental or harmful conditions.104  The Nonhuman Rights Project regularly 
attempts to file habeas corpus writs on behalf of confined animals, but courts 
consistently reject these claims and decline to consider animals legal per-
sons.105  Other organizations have abandoned Wise’s pyramid and instead ad-
vocate for legal standing in lower courts to remedy an animal’s harm, garner-
ing mixed results.106 
 
2019).  For examples of cases in which the Nonhuman Rights Project seeks a writ of habeas corpus 
on behalf of animals held in inappropriate conditions by private owners, see Nonhuman Rights Project, 
Inc. ex rel. Beulah v. R.W. Commerford & Sons, Inc., No. LLICV175009822S, 2017 WL 7053738 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 26, 2017); Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex. rel. Tommy v. Lavery (Lavery 
II), 54 N.Y.S.3d 392 (App. Div. 2017); Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Kiko v. Presti, 999 
N.Y.S.2d 652 (App. Div. 2015); People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery (Lavery I), 
998 N.Y.S.2d 248 (App. Div. 2014).  In Lavery II, the Nonhuman Rights Project argued that “if hu-
mans bereft of autonomy, self-determination, sentience, consciousness, even a brain, are entitled to 
personhood and legal rights, then this Court must either recognize [the animal’s] just equality claim 
to bodily liberty or reject equality entirely.”  Petitioners’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Order to 
Show Cause & Writ of Habeas Corpus and Order Granting the Immediate Release of Tommy at 73, 
Lavery II, 54 N.Y.S.3d 392 (No. 3648); see also Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 49, Lavery II, 54 
N.Y.S.3d 392 (No. 3648). 
 104. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 103.  For example, Lavery I and Lavery II involve a chimpan-
zee, Tommy, who is held alone in a cage, in a shed, on a used trailer lot along a highway in New York.  
Lavery II, 54 N.Y.S.3d at 394; Lavery I, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 248.  Beulah revolves around three elephants 
who are routinely paraded around in a circus/fair by owners who have been cited for Animal Welfare 
Act violations (for failing to adhere to minimum standards of care) more than fifty times.  Beulah, 
2017 WL 7053738, at *1.  Presti is a case about Kiko, a chimpanzee held in a cage in a cement 
storefront in a residential area of Niagara Falls, New York.  999 N.Y.S.2d at 652. 
 105. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 103.  In both Lavery I and Lavery II, the court based its decision 
on the theories of reciprocity and community membership.  Lavery II, 54 N.Y.S.3d 392; Lavery I, 998 
N.Y.S.2d 248.  The theory of reciprocity requires an individual to have the ability to both enjoy rights 
and possess legal duties in order to be characterized as a legal person.  Lavery I, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 250.  
The requirement of community membership states that the enjoyment of rights arises from member-
ship in a political society.  See Lavery II, 54 N.Y.S.3d at 395–96; Lavery I, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 251; 
Davison-Vecchione & Pambos, supra note 47, at 297–98.  However, the Lavery I court noted that 
although they would not accept an animal rights argument, the animals were not left defenseless be-
cause animal cruelty statutes prevent animals from being mistreated.  Lavery I, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 251. 
 106. See, e.g., Marbeled Murrelet v. Pac. Lumber Co., 880 F. Supp. 1343, 1346 (N.D. Cal. 1995) 
(allowing standing for a bird), aff’d sub nom. Marbeled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 
1996); Loggerhead Turtle v. Cty. Council, 896 F. Supp. 1170, 1177 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (allowing stand-
ing for a turtle); Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc. v. New England Aquarium, 
836 F. Supp. 45, 49 (D. Mass. 1993) (denying standing for a dolphin); Hawaiian Crow (‘Alala) v. 
Lujan, 906 F. Supp. 549, 551–52 (D. Haw. 1991) (denying standing to a bird). 
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2. Current State of the Law: Legal Standing 
The standing doctrine is rooted in Article III of the United States Consti-
tution107 and is used to promote separation of powers by granting courts the 
power to hear only “cases” and “controversies” rather than general social 
problems.108  Although the standing requirement is derived from the Consti-
tution, the doctrine “embraces several judicially self-imposed limits on the 
exercise of federal jurisdiction.”109  One such prudential requirement applica-
ble here is the Supreme Court’s “zone of interest” test, which restricts standing 
to only those interests that are “arguably within the zone of interests to be 
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in ques-
tion.”110 
In the 1990s, the Supreme Court decided two important standing cases 
that reflected a narrower approach to the standing doctrine and, in turn, greatly 
limited animals’ legal protections.111  Both cases involved the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA), which is an animal welfare act that provides protection 
from human activity for members of endangered or threatened species and 
their habitats.112  In accordance with animal welfare advocates’ paternalistic 
approach,113 the Act encourages citizen participation to compel enforcement 
 
 107. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2. 
 108. See Kurt S. Kusiak, Standing to Sue: A Brief Review of Current Standing Doctrine, 71 B.U. L. 
REV. 667, 668 (1991); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Sepa-
ration of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 882 (1983). 
 109. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
 110. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997) (citing Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. 
Camp, 387 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)).  Other self-imposed limits include “the general prohibition on a 
litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights [and] the rule barring adjudication of generalized griev-
ances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches.”  Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. 
 111. Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Bennett, 520 U.S. at 154.  Justice Scalia deliv-
ered the opinion of the Court in both Lujan and Bennett.  Lujan, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Bennett, 520 
U.S. at 154.  Prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court, then-Judge Scalia expressed distaste for 
the Court’s expansive approach to standing, especially in environmental cases.  Scalia, supra note 108, 
at 886–90.  Specifically, Judge Scalia argued that a beneficiary (an individual whose interests are 
furthered by the statute) of a statute’s protections must qualify for standing, under a stricter injury-in-
fact test rather than the test imposed upon the object (an individual who is regulated by the statute) of 
a statute’s regulations.  Id. at 895–96; see also Katherine A. Burke, Can We Stand for It? Amending 
the Endangered Species Act with an Animal-Suit Provision, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 633, 645–46 (2004) 
(discussing Justice Scalia’s approach in more detail).  Justice Scalia used Lujan as an opportunity to 
invoke the new stricter injury-in-fact test, and then upheld it in Bennett.  See infra notes 116–29 and 
accompanying text. 
 112. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§  1531–1544 (2018); Burke, supra note 111, at 640. 
 113. See supra Section III.A. 
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through the following citizen-suit provision: 
[A]ny person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf—(A) to 
enjoin any person, including the United States . . . who is alleged to 
be in violation of any provision . . . or (B) to compel the Secretary to 
apply . . . the prohibitions . . . of this title with respect to the taking of 
any resident endangered species or threatened species . . . or (C) 
against the Secretary where there is alleged a failure of the Secretary 
to perform any act or duty.114 
However, as the following Supreme Court decisions demonstrate, the ESA’s 
citizen-suit provision was not formed adequately enough to achieve its desired 
goal.115 
First, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, respondents attempted to invoke 
the citizen-suit provision to compel application of the ESA to federally-
funded projects abroad that may have threatened protected species.116  Justice 
Scalia, writing for the Court,117 introduced a new, stricter injury-in-fact test 
for statutory beneficiaries118—as opposed to statutory objects, who must 
merely satisfy the previous “zone of interests” test.119  The Court held that an 
injury-in-fact must be: 
 
 114. Burke, supra note 111, at 641 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 540(g)(1) (2018)).  Despite the holdings 
discussed in the following paragraphs, the Supreme Court itself acknowledged that the ESA “encour-
aged” citizen involvement in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180–81 (1978).  Id. 
 115. Burke, supra note 111, at 638. 
 116. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558–59. 
 117. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, and IV, in 
which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas joined, and an opin-
ion with respect to Part III-B, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas joined.  
Id. at 557.  Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment and 
was joined by Justice Souter.  Id. at 579.  Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion.  Id. at 581.  Justice 
Blackmun was joined by Justice O’Connor in a dissenting opinion.  Id. at 589. 
 118. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562 (“Thus, when the plaintiff is not himself the object of the govern-
ment action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily ‘substantially more 
difficult’ to establish.”); Burke, supra note 111, at 646. 
 119. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.  In announcing the stricter injury-in-fact test, Justice Scalia also re-
jected three other creative theories of injury: (1) “‘animal nexus’ approach whereby anyone who has 
an interest in studying or seeing the endangered animals anywhere on the globe has standing”; (2) 
“ecosystem nexus,” which “propose[d] that any person who uses any part of a ‘contiguous ecosystem’ 
adversely affected [on the globe] . . . has standing”; and (3) “‘vocational nexus’ approach, under which 
anyone with a professional interest in such animals can sue.”  Id. at 565–66. 
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(a) concrete and particularized and (b) “actual or imminent, not con-
jectural or hypothetical”[;] . . . there must be a causal connection be-
tween the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be 
“fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and 
not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not 
before the court”[;] . . . [and] it must be “likely,” as opposed to 
merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable 
decision.”120 
The Court also rejected an argument of “procedural injury” specifically re-
garding the citizen-suit provision of the ESA because “a generally available 
grievance about government” is not sufficient to state an Article III case or 
controversy.121  Therefore, the citizen-suit provision was insufficient to over-
come the concrete injury required of statutory beneficiaries.122 
Justice Scalia solidified this distinction between statutory beneficiaries 
and statutory objects in Bennett v. Spear when the Court recognized the plain-
tiffs’ standing with minimal requirements.123  In Bennett, the plaintiffs filed 
complaints after the Fish and Wildlife Service, in accordance with the ESA, 
implemented measures to protect two species of endangered fish and their 
habitats.124  Plaintiffs claimed that the protections, if implemented, would “ir-
reparably damage[]” their use of the waterways in question for irrigation and 
aesthetics.125  The lower courts aptly applied the “zone of interests” test and 
held that plaintiffs did not have standing because their “recreational, aesthetic, 
and commercial interests . . . [did] not fall within the zone of interests sought 
 
 120. Id. at 560–61 (alteration in original). 
 121. Id. at 573–75. 
 122. Id. at 574–75. 
 123. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164 (1997).  Here, the Court merely required that the plaintiffs 
satisfy the “zone of interests” test, rather than the injury-in-fact test applied in Lujan.  Id.; see also 
Burke, supra note 111, at 646–47 (“When ‘the plaintiff is complaining of an agency’s unlawful failure 
to impose a requirement or prohibition upon someone else,’ that plaintiff asserts ‘majoritarian’ con-
cerns, which belong in the political sphere.  In order to overcome that presumption against standing 
and obtain judicial redress, a statutory beneficiary must meet a very stringent injury-in-fact 
test . . . .  In marked contrast to judicial skepticism about the standing of statutory beneficiaries, 
‘[w]hen an individual who is the very object of a law’s requirement or prohibition seeks to challenge 
it,’ this party should always have standing to sue.” (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting 
Scalia, supra note 108, at 894)). 
 124. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 158–59. 
 125. Id. at 160. 
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to be protected by the ESA.”126  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
Congress expressly negated127 the “zone of interests” test by including the cit-
izen-suit provision in the ESA.128  Therefore, the Court determined that the 
“zone of interests” test did not apply to the plaintiffs’ case, and the plaintiffs’ 
alleged injury was sufficient to grant standing.129 
The effect of Justice Scalia’s contrasting opinions—and the current state 
of Congress’s attempt to protect animals—is confounding.130  The Lujan and 
Bennett decisions make it increasingly difficult for Congress to confer stand-
ing upon the groups it seeks to protect.131  After Bennett, a plaintiff may invoke 
the ESA’s citizen-suit provision to inhibit animal protections and advance hu-
man interests, but according to Lujan a plaintiff may not invoke the same pro-
vision to encourage animal protections.132 
Fortunately, the Court’s holdings in Lujan and Bennett are not required 
by the Constitution, but rather by the Court’s own prudence.133  Contrary to a 
constitutional requirement, the Court’s self-imposed prudential requirements 
may “be modified or abrogated by Congress.”134  Congress has the ability to 
grant a private right of action to a group of individuals to circumvent the 
Court’s prudential standing requirements.135  Congress has generally used this 
power to explicitly grant private rights of action to injured individuals who 
need protection and lack other remedies.136  For example, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act grants disabled individuals the right to bring their own causes 
of action against employers, government entities, and public accommodations 
who violate the statute.137  The Court has also honored implied private rights 
 
 126. Id. at 160–61 (citing Bennett v. Plenart, 63 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
 127. Contrary to Lujan, in Bennett the citizen-suit provision was sufficient to negate the Court’s 
other self-imposed, prudential requirements.  Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163. 
 128. Id. at 164. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Burke, supra note 111, at 648–49. 
 131. Id. at 642. 
 132. Id. at 646–48. 
 133. See, e.g., Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 
107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 170–74 (2012). 
 134. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1975) (“In some 
circumstances, countervailing considerations may outweigh the concerns underlying the usual reluc-
tance to exert judicial power . . . .”). 
 135. Burke, supra note 111, at 650. 
 136. See, e.g., Susan J. Stabile, Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence of Im-
plied Private Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861 (1996). 
 137. See Private Suits, 28 C.F.R. § 36.501 (2018). 
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of action in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934138 and Titles VI and IX of 
the Civil Rights Act.139  For a private right of action to be upheld, Congress 
must clearly and narrowly define both the potential plaintiff and the injury to 
be protected against.140  Congress must also “adequately link the defined in-
juries to the defined class of plaintiffs now empowered to sue.”141 
Although Congress’s attempt at a citizen-suit provision in the ESA was 
ultimately unsuccessful, lawmakers retain the ability to try again.142  To exe-
cute a proper citizen-suit provision, Congress should tailor any further animal 
protection legislation to comply with the Court’s clearly demonstrated re-
quirements.143 
IV. A SAMPLING OF STATUTES 
Animal cruelty is a criminal offense in every state, but definitions and 
punishments vary across states and statutes.144  States often do not have ade-
 
 138. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432–35 (1964) (finding a private right of action exists 
under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, despite other remedies available to plain-
tiff); Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Private Investor Has Private Right of Action Under Section 
14(a), 1962 DUKE L.J. 151 (1962). 
 139. See Rebecca D. Graves, An Implied Private Right of Action Under Title VI, 37 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 297 (1980).  Although the Supreme Court has not expressly decided whether a private right 
of action is implied under Title VI, the Court has allowed two separate, private plaintiffs to recover 
directly under the statute.  See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Lau v. Nichols, 
414 U.S. 563 (1974).  The Court did expressly hold in Cannon v. University of Chicago that a private 
right of action exists under Title IX.  441 U.S. 677 (1979).  The Court’s holding in Cannon “was based 
on the legislative history indicating that Congress intended Title IX to be enforced like Title VI, and 
that Congress believed Title VI to encompass a private right of action.”  Graves, supra note 139, at 
304. 
 140. Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992).  
 141. Burke, supra note 111, at 657 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580). 
 142. Id. at 651; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights), 47 
UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1361 (2000) (noting that nothing in the Constitution prevents Congress from 
granting standing to animals). 
 143. See infra Part V; see also Burke, supra note 111, at 658–60 (analyzing Congressional power 
to enact an animal-suit provision within the Endangered Species Act according to the Supreme Court’s 
standing requirements). 
 144. See, e.g., 2018 U.S. Animal Protection Laws State Rankings, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, 
https://aldf.org/project/2018-us-state-rankings/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2019).  Despite the differences, 
state laws generally protect domestic or companion animals and some states protect wildlife.  Laws 
That Protect Animals, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, https://aldf.org/article/laws-that-protect-animals/ 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2019).  State protections regularly exclude farmed and laboratory animals.  Id. 
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quate resources to expend on animals, and many states do not prioritize en-
forcement of animal cruelty protections.145  This Part introduces the newly-
enacted federal animal cruelty statute as a building block and samples three 
states’ provisions—Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Oregon—for inspiration 
for an even more comprehensive federal solution to animal cruelty.146 
A. The Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture Act 
In November 2019, Congress enacted the Preventing Animal Cruelty and 
Torture Act (PACT) to prohibit animal crushing as well as the creation or 
distribution of animal crush videos.147  As defined in PACT, animal crushing 
refers to “conduct in which one or more living non-human mammals, birds, 
reptiles, or amphibians is purposefully crushed, burned, drowned, suffocated, 
impaled, or otherwise subjected to serious bodily injury.”148  Serious bodily 
injury includes “bodily injury which involves (a) a substantial risk of death, 
(b) extreme physical pain, (c) protracted and obvious disfigurement, or (d) 
protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or 
mental faculty.”149  PACT is rooted in the commerce clause of the Constitu-
tion, which means the law only applies to animal crushing that is related to 
interstate commerce or takes place on federal land.150  For example, a dog 
 
 145. See Animal Advocacy and Causes of Action, supra note 6; see also Katie Galanes, The Con-
tradiction: Animal Abuse—Alive and Well, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 209, 221 (2010) (“The most sig-
nificant issue in dealing with animal cruelty, animal abuse, and dogfighting cases is an overall lack of 
enforcement.”). 
 146. See infra Part V, which analyzes the pertinent provisions and combines those provisions into 
a federal Proposed Animal Protection Bill. 
 147. Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture Act, Pub. L. No. 116-72, 133 Stat. 1151 (2019) (to be 
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 48).  Representative Theodore E. Deutch introduced the bill to the House of 
Representatives on January 23, 2019 to replace the previous animal crushing statute that was deemed 
unconstitutional in United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010), on the grounds that it was too broad 
and could have prohibited activities protected by the First Amendment.  See Animal Crush Video 
Prohibition Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-152, 113 Stat. 1732 (1999) (previously codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 48).  The PACT passed in the House of Representatives on October 22, 2019 and in the 
Senate on November 5, 2019.  H.R. Rep. No. 116–724 (2019).  President Trump signed the PACT 
into public law, effective immediately, on November 25, 2019.  Id. 
 148. Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture Act, Pub. L. No. 116-72, 133 Stat. 1151, 1152 (2019) 
(to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 48(f)(1)). 
 149. 18 U.S.C. § 1365(h)(3). 
 150. Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture Act, Pub. L. No. 116-72, 133 Stat. 1151, 1151 (2019) 
(to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 48(a)(1)) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to purposefully engage in 
animal crushing in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce . . . .” (emphasis added)).  According 
to the Commerce Clause, Congress has the enumerated power “to regulate commerce with foreign 
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breeder who sells his puppies across state lines is engaged in interstate com-
merce and therefore would be prohibited by PACT from engaging in any an-
imal crushing behavior.151    
 The PACT should be applauded as a genuine step forward for animal pro-
tections, but it may also be too narrowly tailored to make a significant differ-
ence.152  States are still left to manage the overwhelming workload of investi-
gating and prosecuting animal cruelty cases that do not cross state lines and 
even in cases where the PACT applies, the federal government may not prior-
itize animal welfare when resources are limited. 153  Of course, the actual ef-
fects of PACT are yet to be determined and the animal welfare community 
remains optimistic that this new law can bring about much-needed assistance 
from the federal government.154  
 
nations, and among the several states.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 151. See Danny Prater, Animal Abuse Now a Federal Offense After Passage of PACT Act, PETA 
(Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.peta.org/blog/pact-act-signed-into-law/. 
 152. Id.; see also Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture (PACT) Act, ANIMAL WELFARE INST., 
https://awionline.org/content/preventing-animal-cruelty-and-torture-pact-act (last visited Dec. 31, 
2019); Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture (PACT) Act (Federal), ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, 
https://aldf.org/project/preventing-animal-cruelty-and-torture-pact-act/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2019); 
Joshua Bote, House Unanimously Passes Bipartisan Bill to Make Animal Cruelty a Federal Crime, 
USA TODAY (Oct. 24, 2019, 4:57 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/10/23/ 
house-passes-bipartisan-bill-make-animal-cruelty-federal-crime/4076657002/ (containing a statement 
from the ASPCA in support of the PACT Act). 
 153. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; infra note 169. 
 154. See Gabrielle Wast, The PACT Act: A Step in the Right Direction on the Path to Animal Wel-
fare, JURIST (Dec. 1, 2019, 8:55:43 PM), https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2019/12/courtney-lee-
pact-act/. 
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B. Connecticut’s Animal Advocate Provision 
Connecticut animal protection statutes include liability for (a) intention-
ally killing or injuring a companion animal,155 (b) general cruelty to ani-
mals,156 (c) malicious and intentional injury or killing,157 and (d) special stat-
utes for injury or killing of service or law enforcement animals.158  Various 
animal fighting activities and sexual assault of an animal are also prohib-
ited.159  Animal protection statutes generally exempt veterinary practice, re-
search animals, wildlife, and accepted farm animal husbandry practices.160 
In 2016, Connecticut enacted a statute (the Advocate Act) allowing a 
court to appoint an advocate in proceedings regarding the welfare or custody 
of a cat or dog.161  When the court deems it necessary or upon request of a 
party, a court may appoint an advocate—from a list of advocates162 maintained 
 
 155. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22-351 (2019).  A first offense is generally classified as a misdemeanor, 
with a sentence of six months imprisonment and/or $1,000 fine.  Id.  A second offense is a class E 
felony.  Id. 
 156. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-247(a) (2019).  A first offense is generally classified as a misde-
meanor, with a sentence of up to one-year imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $1,000.  Id.  A second 
offense is a class D felony.  Id. 
 157. Id. § 53-247(b).  A first offense is a class D felony and a second offense is a class C felony.  
Id. 
 158. Id. § 53-247(d)–(e).  Intentional injury of a service or law enforcement animal is a class D 
felony.  Id. § 53-247(d).  Intentional killing of a law enforcement animal is a felony and carries a 
sentence of up to ten years imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $10,000.  Id. § 53-247(e). 
 159. Id. § 53-247(c) (prohibiting animal fighting activities); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-73a (2018) 
(classifying sexual assault of an animal as a class A misdemeanor). 
 160. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-247(b) (2019). 
 161. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86n (2019).  Connecticut is the first to enact a law of this kind; how-
ever, officials in other states such as New Jersey, New York, and Maine have shown interest in enact-
ing similar provisions.  Michelle Tuccitto Sullo, Animal Advocates Help to Bring Justice for Abused 
Cats and Dogs, NEW HAVEN REGISTER, https://www.nhregister.com/news/article/Animal-advocates-
help-to-bring-justice-for-abused-13565197.php (last updated Jan. 27, 2019, 1:23 PM).  California and 
a federal district court in Virginia have also used comparable provisions in the past.  See CAL. PROB. 
CODE §§ 1003, 15212 (2016).  California allows appointment of a guardian ad litem to advocate for 
the interests of an animal when that animal is the beneficiary of a trust.  Id. § 1003(a).  The United 
States District Court in the Eastern District of Virginia also appointed a guardian, Rebecca J. Huss, 
for the animal victims in the Michael Vick dogfighting case.  See Nicole Pallotta, Unique Connecticut 
Law Allows Court-Appointed Advocates to Represent Animals, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND 
https://aldf.org/article/unique-connecticut-law-allows-court-appointed-advocates-to-represent-ani-
mals/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2019); see, e.g., Rebecca J. Huss, Lessons Learned: Acting as Guardian/Spe-
cial Master in the Bad Newz Kennels Case, 15 ANIMAL L. 69 (2008). 
 162. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86n(c) (2019).  Advocates are generally lawyers working pro-bono or 
approved law students.  Id. 
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by the Department of Agriculture—“to represent the interests of justice.”163  
Once appointed:  
The advocate may: (1) Monitor the case; (2) consult any individual 
with information that could aid the judge or fact finder and review 
records relating to the condition of the cat or dog and the defendant’s 
actions, including, but not limited to, records from animal control of-
ficers, veterinarians and police officers; (3) attend hearings; and (4) 
present information or recommendations to the court pertinent to de-
terminations that relate to the interests of justice, provided such in-
formation and recommendations shall be based solely upon the duties 
undertaken pursuant to this subsection.164 
According to the statute’s summary, the Advocate Act’s purpose is “[t]o per-
mit the use of animal advocates in certain legal proceedings relating to ne-
glected or cruelly treated animals.”165  Unlike Connecticut’s other animal pro-
tections, the Advocate Act is narrowly defined to only include cats and dogs 
and specifically requires advocates to act in the interests of justice, rather than 
the best interests of the animal (although the two interests hopefully coin-
cide).166  Advocates should not be compared to a child’s guardian167 in welfare 
or custody cases, but the animal advocates handle much of the work that over-
whelmed prosecutors may not have time or resources for, such as conducting 
research and interviews, preparing evidence for trial, or even making recom-
mendations to the judge.168  From October 2016 to January 2019, Connecticut 
courts appointed animal advocates in forty-eight animal abuse cases and the 
state has seen a significant increase in punishments and fines against animal 
 
 163. Id. § 54-86n(a), (c). 
 164. Id. § 54-86n(b). 
 165. H.B. 5344, 2016 Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2016) (enacted). 
 166. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86n (2019).  An earlier draft of the Act stated that advocates should 
act in the “animal’s best interests.”  CONN. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., OFF. LEGIS. RES. BILL 
ANALYSIS, SUBSTITUTE H.B. 5344 (as amended by House “A”), 2016 Sess. (Conn. 2016), 
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2016/ba/2016hb-05344-r01-ba.htm.  This language was replaced with “inter-
ests of justice” for the enacted law.  Id. 
 167. Connecticut laws regarding children’s representatives require the representative to advocate or 
argue on behalf of the child’s best interest, which, as seen supra note 166, was rejected in the case of 
the Advocate Act.  See Nancy E. Halpern, Connecticut Advocates for Justice, Not Animals, FOX 
ROTHSCHILD LLP (June 14, 2017), https://animallaw.foxrothschild.com/2017/06/14/connecticut-ad-
vocates-for-justice-not-animals/. 
 168. See Sullo, supra note 161. 
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abusers.169 
C. Pennsylvania’s Humane Law Enforcement Officers 
Pennsylvania animal protection statutes include liability for (a) abandon-
ment or poisoning of a dog,170 (b) neglect, cruelty, or overworking an ani-
mal,171 (c) taunting, tormenting, striking, or injuring a law enforcement ani-
mal,172 and (d) other specialized circumstances constituting abuse.173  
Pennsylvania also prohibits animal fighting activities (including spectator-
ship) and any form of sexual intercourse with an animal.174  Animal protection 
statutes generally exempt veterinary practice, research animals, wildlife, pest 
control, and accepted farm animal husbandry practices.175 
Pennsylvania’s animal cruelty code also includes a civil action provision 
that empowers humane society officers—called Humane Law Enforcement 
Officers (HLEO)—to initiate criminal proceedings against an animal 
abuser.176  HLEOs are employed by humane societies,177 appointed by a court 
 
 169. Id.  Prior to 2016, about 80% of animal cruelty offenses were dismissed or not prosecuted.  Id. 
 170. 3 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 459-601(b), (c) (West 2019). 
 171. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5531, 5532, 5534, 5540 (2018).  Although “animal” is not defined in 
the animal cruelty statute, other listed definitions include protections for the following animals or 
categories of animals: bear, bovine animal, bull, cat, cock, cow, dog, equine animal (including horses, 
asses, mules, ponies, and zebra), fowl, goat, honey bees, pigeons, porcine animal, sheep, or other crea-
ture.  Id. § 5531. 
 172. 3 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 459-602(a), (b) (West 2019). 
 173. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5535–5549 (2018).  Other included circumstances include (a) 
attack of a guide dog, (b) tethering an unattended animal, (c) transporting animals in a cruel manner, 
(d) cruelty to a cow to enhance appearance of udder, (e) killing homing pigeons, (f) live animals as 
prizes, and (g) assaulting an animal with biological agent.  Id. 
 174. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5543–5544 (2018). 
 175. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5536, 5538, 5542, 5553, 5560, 5561 (2018); 63 PA. STAT. AND CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 485.32(4) (West 2019).  Although veterinary practice in general is exempted, it is un-
lawful for a person to practice veterinary medicine on animals he or she owns.  63 PA. STAT. AND 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 485.32(4). 
 176. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5551 (2018); 22 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3708 (2018).  For a generally com-
prehensive table of applicable state statutes and the powers granted to humane societies, see Cynthia 
F. Hodges, Table of Enforcement Powers Granted to Humane Societies by State, ANIMAL LEGAL & 
HIST. CENTER (2012), https://www.animallaw.info/topic/table-humane-society-enforcement-powers.  
Many states allow humane societies to enforce animal cruelty statutes in some capacity.  Id.  A humane 
officer’s authority will vary by state and could fall anywhere on the spectrum, from providing medical 
care to seized animals to investigating and prosecuting abuse cases.  Id. 
 177. In order to employ an HLEO, a humane society must be a nonprofit organization, and is usually 
a 501(c)(3) charity funded by private donations.  Elizabeth Anderson, Protecting Lassie, Morris and 
Mr. Ed: Pennsylvania’s Evolving Animal Cruelty Statute, 89 PA. B. ASS’N. Q. 58, 60 (2018). 
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to enforce (within a designated county) only the animal cruelty sections of the 
criminal code, and have the power and authority to (a) investigate cases under 
the animal cruelty statutes, (b) rescue or seize abandoned or mistreated ani-
mals, (c) apply for and execute search warrants, and (d) prosecute or assist in 
the prosecution of animal abusers.178  Similar to Connecticut’s animal advo-
cates, HLEOs lessen the burden felt by overworked prosecutors and under-
staffed police departments.179  Contrary to Connecticut’s animal advocates, 
who merely assist prosecutors in animal abuse proceedings, HLEOs can com-
mand the proceedings from an initial report of abuse—reported to a humane 
society’s dispatch team—all the way through prosecution.180  Training to be-
come a qualified HLEO consists of forty hours of instruction pertaining to law 
enforcement duties and forty hours of instruction pertaining to animal care 
and accepted animal husbandry practices.181  While they have been helpful in 
initiating and investigating animal abuse cases, most HLEOs are not properly 
trained in the intricate aspects of police or legal work, such as application of 
Miranda warnings or filing criminal complaints.182 
D. Oregon’s Victim Classification 
Oregon animal protection statutes include liability for: (a) inflicting or 
encouraging animal abuse, neglect, or abandonment,183 (b) threatening injury 
 
 178. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5551 (2018); 22 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3708 (2018). 
 179. Diana Bocco, Pennsylvania SPCA’s Humane Law Enforcement Officers: What They Do and 
Why, HONEST KITCHEN (Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.thehonestkitchen.com/blog/pennsylvania-
spcas-humane-law-enforcement-officers/. 
 180. Id. 
 181. 22 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3712(d) (2018). 
 182. Anderson, supra note 177, at 60.  “Miranda warnings” refers to the case of Miranda v. Arizona, 
in which the Supreme Court held that a defendant cannot be questioned by police in the context of a 
custodial interrogation until the defendant is made aware of the right to remain silent, the right to 
consult with an attorney and have the attorney present during questioning, and the right to have an 
attorney appointed if indigent.  384 U.S. 436 (1966).  If the HLEO does not properly provide a Mi-
randa warning to a defendant, statements made by that defendant may be inadmissible evidence at 
trial.  See id.  Because the HLEOs—and the humane societies that employ them—bear the costs and 
liabilities of prosecuting a defendant under an animal cruelty statute, they cannot afford even the 
slightest of legal mistakes.  Jonas Fortune, Oversight of Humane Society Police Officer Position in 
Lancaster County Not Clear, LANCASTERONLINE (Sept. 12, 2016), https://lancasteronline.com/ 
news/local/oversight-of-humane-society-police-officer-position-in-lancaster-county/arti-
cle_e8da6f98-76d5-11e6-8222-cb2b131dfad6.html. 
 183. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 167.315, 167.320, 167.322, 167.325, 167.330, 167.340, 167.349 (2017). 
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to an animal to coerce a person’s behavior,184 (c) assaulting a law enforcement 
animal or interfering with an assistance, search and rescue, or therapy ani-
mal,185 and (d) unlawful tethering, horse tripping, trading in nonambulatory 
livestock, or violating a standard of care for breeding dogs.186  Various animal 
fighting activities and participating in or encouraging sexual activity with an 
animal are also prohibited.187  The animal protection statutes generally exempt 
veterinary practice, research animals, wildlife, accepted farm animal hus-
bandry practices, slaughter, pest control, and rodeos.188 
In 2014, the Oregon Supreme Court decided two cases that significantly 
bolstered animal protections and could potentially initiate a plausible compro-
mise for animal rights and animal welfare advocates.189  In State v. Fessenden, 
the Oregon Supreme Court upheld a police officer’s seizure of an emaciated 
horse without a warrant on the basis that exigent circumstances and an emer-
gency aid exception justified the warrantless seizure.190  Although the court 
 
 184. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.275 (2017). 
 185. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 167.339, 167.352 (2017).  A “search and rescue animal” is one that “has 
been professionally trained for, and is actively used for, search and rescue purposes.”  Id. 
§ 167.352(3)(a).  A “therapy animal” is “an animal other than an assistance animal that has been pro-
fessionally trained for, and is actively used for, therapy purposes.”  Id. § 167.352(3)(b).  An “assistance 
animal” is “a dog or other animal designated by administrative rule that has been individually trained 
to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual.”  OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.143(1)(a) (2017). 
 186. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 167.343, 167.351, 167.374, 167.376, 167.383 (2017).  “Tethering” refers 
to the “restrain[t] [of] a domestic animal by tying the domestic animal to any object or structure by 
any means.”  Id. § 167.310(14)(a).  “Nonambulatory livestock” is livestock that is “unable to stand or 
walk unassisted” and trading in such livestock consists of “knowingly deliver[ing] or accept[ing] de-
livery of a nonambulatory livestock animal at a livestock auction market.”  Id. § 167.351(1)(a), (2). 
 187. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163A.005(s) (West 2018); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 167.333, 167.355–
167.439, 167.341(2017). 
 188. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 167.315, 167.320, 167.332, 167.335 (2017).  Exemption provisions do not 
protect acts committed with gross negligence, however.  Id. § 167.335.  Accepted farm animal hus-
bandry practices “include[], but [are] not limited to, the dehorning of cattle, the docking of horses, 
sheep or swine, and the castration or neutering of livestock, according to accepted practices of veteri-
nary medicine or animal husbandry.”  Id. § 167.310(6). 
 189. Erica R. Tatoian, Animals in the Law: Occupying a Space Between Legal Personhood and 
Personal Property, 31 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 147, 160 (2015); see State v. Fessenden, 333 P.3d 278 
(Or. 2014); State v. Nix (Nix I), 283 P.3d 442 (Or. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d 334 P.3d 437 (Or. 2014), 
vacated, 345 P.3d 416 (Or. 2015) (vacated for procedural errors). 
 190. Fessenden, 333 P.3d at 278.  Because an animal is classified as property, any seizure by law 
enforcement requires one of three conditions: (a) a warrant for entry and seizure, (b) a need for emer-
gency aid, or (c) exigent circumstances.  Id.  The emergency aid exception applies when “the need to 
render emergency aid or prevent serious injury or harm is an appropriate justification for an immediate 
warrantless entry.”  Id. at 281–82 (quoting State v. Baker, 260 P.3d 476, 481 (Or. 2011)).  A situation 
is exigent when it “requires the police to act swiftly to prevent danger to life or serious damage to 
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admitted that “Oregon law still considers animals to be property,” it held that 
“[d]omestic animals . . . receive special consideration under Oregon law” be-
cause they “occupy a unique position in people’s hearts and in the law.”191 
The same day, in State v. Nix, the Oregon Supreme Court found that an 
animal can be classified as a “victim” under the state’s anti-merger statute 
after a criminal court found a defendant guilty of twenty counts of second-
degree animal abuse.192  Unfortunately, during sentencing, the trial court 
merged the verdicts into a single conviction because “animals are not victims” 
as defined under the Oregon anti-merger statute.193  On appeal, the court de-
cided that the word “victim” in the anti-merger statute referred to animal vic-
tims when the defendant has violated the second-degree animal neglect stat-
ute.194  Although the defendant argued that animals are considered property of 
their owners and therefore cannot be “victims,” Oregon’s Supreme Court af-
firmed the appellate court, finding that the text, context, and legislative history 
of the statute clearly demonstrated legislative intent to recognize the neglected 
animals as the victims of the offense.195  Thus, contrary to mere personal prop-
erty, an animal in Oregon can now be a legal victim of its owner’s abuse or 
neglect.196 
In the fall of 2018, the Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) sought to test 
the outer limits of the Oregon courts’ willingness to expand on this concept 
of animals as victims by bringing a negligence claim on behalf on an abused 
 
property.”  Id. at 282 (quoting State v. Stevens, 806 P.2d 92, 98 (Or. 1991)).  The court noted that the 
emergency aid exception generally applies to humans while the exigent circumstances exception ap-
plies to animals as property.  Id.  However, the court concluded that both the emergency aid and 
exigent circumstances exceptions applied in this case because the officer “reasonably believed . . . that 
immediate action was necessary to prevent further imminent harm to and the death of the horse.”  Id. 
at 279. 
 191. Id. at 283–84. 
 192. State v. Nix (Nix II), 334 P.3d 437, 438 (Or. 2014) (quoting Nix I, 283 P.3d at 443).   
The defendant was charged with twenty-three counts of animal neglect and seventy counts of second-
degree animal abuse, with each count corresponding to a different animal.  Nix I, 283 P.3d at 443. 
 193.  Nix I, 283 P.3d at 444.  The anti-merger statute declares that “[w]hen the same conduct or 
criminal episode, though violating only one statutory provision involves two or more victims, there 
are as many separately punishable offenses as there are victims.”  OR. REV. STAT. § 161.067(2) (2017). 
 194. Nix I, 283 P.3d at 449. 
 195. Nix II, 334 P.3d at 443 (“The phrasing of the offense [in the animal negligence statute] re-
veal[ed] that the legislature’s focus was the treatment of individual animals, not harm to the public 
generally or harm to the owners of the animals.”). 
 196. Although Nix I was later vacated for a procedural error, the Oregon Court of Appeals adopted 
the court’s argument in State v. Hess, 359 P.3d 288, 293 (Or. Ct. App. 2015), stating that “we none-
theless are persuaded by the Nix court’s reasoning on the merger question, and we adopt it.” 
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and neglected horse named Justice, against his abuser.197  The district court 
dismissed the case, but ALDF filed a notice to appeal the decision on January 
22, 2019.198  The complaint, filed in the district court, alleged that when Jus-
tice’s previous owner surrendered him to an equine rescue, he was severely 
emaciated and suffered from lice, rain rot, and genital frost bite and necro-
sis.199  Justice’s previous owner pled guilty to misdemeanor animal neglect 
and was ordered to pay restitution for Justice’s past incurred medical costs.200  
However, the complaint alleged that Justice continues to require extensive 
medical care for the foreseeable future, if not for the rest of his life.201  Alt-
hough Justice is currently living at a rescue, the fact that he will have contin-
uous and substantial medical bills significantly decreases his opportunities to 
be adopted into a permanent home.202  Represented by the ALDF, Justice is 
seeking damages from his previous owner for future medical costs and pain 
and suffering.203  According to the complaint, the ALDF will deposit any dam-
ages awarded into a trust—of which Justice will be the sole beneficiary—to 
provide for his medical costs as long as possible.204 
To provide necessary and standardized protections for animals across the 
United States, Congress should build on the PACT and combine Connecticut, 
 
 197. See, e.g., Justice Complaint, supra note 1.  Matthew Liebman, the director of ALDF litigation, 
believes that this case is modest because they are “not seeking to establish federal constitutional rights 
for animals.”  Joyeeta Biswas, Horse’s Case Raises an Important Question: What Would Happen if 
Animals Could Sue Us?, ABC NEWS (Aug. 23, 2018, 2:28 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/horses-
case-raises-important-question-happen-animals-sue/story?id=57167970.  This case, he argues, is 
merely following the logical progression set in motion by Nix II.  Justice Complaint, supra note 1, at 
12.  If an animal is considered a victim of animal neglect statutes, and victims can sue their abusers 
for negligence per se, then theoretically, as a victim of criminal neglect, Justice should be able to sue 
his abuser.  Id. at 10–11. 
 198. Animal Legal Defense Fund Appeals Dismissal of Groundbreaking Lawsuit for Abused Horse, 
ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND (Jan. 22, 2019), https://aldf.org/article/animal-legal-defense-fund-ap-
peals-dismissal-of-groundbreaking-lawsuit-for-abused-horse/. 
 199. Justice Complaint, supra note 1, at 4–6.  Justice was found at least 300 pounds underweight.  
Id. at 4.  His “penis was swollen, traumatized, infected and prolapsed, with a moderate amount of 
necrotic tissue that had to be removed.”  Id. at 5.  Justice had also contracted penile frost bite, which 
led to infection and scarring, and will most likely result in paralysis or the need for amputation.  Id. at 
5, 7.  “Justice also suffered from lice and rain rot, a bacterial skin infection that irritates a horse’s hair 
and skin and may result in a continuous painful sheet of scabbing.”  Id. at 6.  
 200. Id. at 8.  Defendant did not pay the court-ordered restitution before the deadline of August 10, 
2017.  Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 7–8. 
 203. Id. at 13. 
 204. Id. at 8. 
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Oregon, and Pennsylvania’s attempts at animal protection into a workable fed-
eral legislative measure.205 
V. A PROPOSED FEDERAL SOLUTION 
Despite America’s evolving perspective toward companion animals, so-
ciety is probably not prepared for the potential ramifications accompanying a 
decision to classify animals as legal persons.206  Professor Steven Wise diag-
nosed seven categories of issues that must be managed before society can ex-
tend comprehensive legal rights to animals:  
(1) the physical problem—the sheer number of animals we kill and 
exploit each day; (2) the economic problem—the size and extent of 
industries that depend on the use of animals; (3) the political prob-
lem—the way in which our socio-economic fabric is interwoven with 
the exploitation of animals; (4) the religious problem—the Judeo-
Christian tradition of human dominion over animals; (5) the historical 
problem—the traditions of western philosophy and law with regard 
to the status of animals; (6) the legal problem—the fact that animals 
are categorized as property and therefore can only be the subjects of 
others’ legal interests; and (7) the psychological problem—deeply 
held beliefs about the proper relationship of humans and animals.207 
In addition to the unsolved issues presented within Wise’s seven categories, 
classifying animals as legal persons may be dangerous for the most vulnerable 
humans in our society.208  Professor Richard Cupp argues against allowing 
animal legal personhood based on animals’ cognitive abilities because includ-
ing cognitive abilities in the standard of what makes a legal person will inev-
itably diminish protections for the least intelligent humans.209  Although Cupp 
 
 205. See infra Part V. 
 206. Geordie Duckler, The Necessity of Treating Animals as Legal Objects, 7 J. ANIMAL & ENVTL. 
L. 1 (2016). 
 207. Burke, supra note 111, at 635–36 (citing WISE, DRAWING THE LINE, supra note 24, at 9–23). 
 208. See, e.g., Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Cognitively Impaired Humans, Intelligent Animals, and Legal 
Personhood, 69 FLA. L. REV. 465 (2017) [hereinafter Cupp, Intelligent Animals]; Richard L. Cupp, 
Jr., Edgy Animal Welfare, 95 DENV. L. REV. 865 (2018) [hereinafter Cupp, Edgy Animal Welfare]; 
Cupp, Litigating Legal Personhood, supra note 93. 
 209. See Cupp, Litigating Legal Personhood, supra note 93, at 594 (“But, over time, both the courts 
and society might be tempted not only to view the most intelligent animals more like we now view 
humans but also to view the least intelligent humans more like we now view animals.”); see also 
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presents a slippery slope argument,210 to best avoid his proposed negative con-
sequences, animal protections should be initiated by the legislature and en-
acted with due caution.211 
Enacting a federal ban against animal crushing was a critical step toward 
protecting animals, but the federal government can and should go further.212  
Many state animal protection provisions are insufficient to properly address 
the issue of animal cruelty, and states regularly do not have the resources to 
enforce the statutes.213  Congress should look to the state animal protection 
statutes for guidance and combine elements from different states to enact truly 
effective and standardized protections.214  This Article submits a Proposed 
Animal Protection Bill (Proposed Bill)215 in accordance with state statutes and 
federal judicial requirements, which aims to include (a) general provisions 
against animal cruelty (not limited to crushing), (b) a civil action provision for 
criminal investigations, (c) an animal advocate provision for criminal prose-
cutions and civil causes of action, and (d) an animal suit provision for civil 
 
Laurence H. Tribe, Ten Lessons Our Constitutional Experience Can Teach Us About the Puzzle of 
Animal Rights: The Work of Steven M. Wise, 7 ANIMAL L. 1, 7 (2001) (arguing that requiring intelli-
gence for legal personhood could lead to “genocidal and horrific” consequences). 
 210. A slippery slope argument rejects a course of action “because, with little or no evidence, one 
insists that it will lead to a chain reaction resulting in an undesirable end or ends.  The slippery slope 
involves an acceptance of a succession of events without direct evidence that this course of events will 
happen.”  Slippery Slope, TEX. ST. U. DEP’T OF PHIL., https://www.txstate.edu/philosophy/re-
sources/fallacy-definitions/Slippery-Slope.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2019).  Cupp’s article, Edgy Ani-
mal Welfare, specifically addresses “slippery rhetoric and slippery slopes.”  Cupp, Edgy Animal Wel-
fare, supra note 208, at 865.  Cupp argues:  
Virtually all legal reforms providing stronger protections for animals have at least some 
potential to contribute to the slipperiness of a slope that could cause society to slide down-
ward into a harmful animal rights legal paradigm . . . .  [B]ecause any time law evolves to 
give more protections to animals it brings legal requirements regarding them at least a bit 
closer to legal requirements regarding humans. 
Id. at 869. 
 211. See Cupp, Human Responsibility, supra note 36, at 539. 
 212. See Chokshi, supra note 8; West, supra note 154. 
 213. Id.; see also 2018 U.S. Animal Protection Laws State Rankings, supra note 144 (ranking states 
according to the quality of their animal protection laws). 
 214. See supra Sections IV.B–D, for discussions of such state provisions. 
 215. The Proposed Bill incorporates elements of both legal rights arguments and legal welfare ar-
guments.  See supra Section III.A (discussing animal rights and animal welfare arguments).  The Bill 
recommends granting an animal victim the legal right to sue his abuser, but also integrates animal 
welfare policies allowing humans to protect animals from unnecessary suffering in a more paternalistic 
system.  See infra Section V.D (discussing legal rights for animal victims); infra Sections V.A–C 
(discussing human participation). 
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damages.216 
A. General Provisions 
The Proposed Animal Protection Bill builds on the animal crushing pro-
hibition and recommends liability for (a) animal crushing, (b) general neglect 
or cruelty to pet animals, (c) abandonment, (d) animal fighting activities or 
spectatorship, (e) sexual activity with an animal, and (f) special provisions for 
service, therapy, or law enforcement animals.217  Similar to most state statutes, 
the Proposed Animal Protection Bill should also include exemptions for vet-
erinary practices, research animals, wildlife, and accepted farm animal hus-
bandry practices.218  The definitions of a pet,219 service, therapy, or law en-
forcement animal should be construed narrowly to limit frivolous lawsuits or 
an overcrowding of courts.220  Maximum penalties should include citations, 
misdemeanors, or felonies and a statute of limitations of two to four years 
(depending on the maximum penalty level) would apply.221  Veterinarians 
 
 216. See infra Sections V.A–D.  This Article combines general practices across many states in order 
to propose a workable statute that is more likely to be enacted.  See supra Part IV.  Because many of 
the states have already enacted similar provisions, the Author assumes that a national consensus has 
generally been formed concerning the suggested provisions, and therefore, the proposal is probably 
not too extreme to be enacted.  See supra Part IV (describing the animal protection statutes of Con-
necticut, Pennsylvania, and Oregon, some of which overlap and indicate a national consensus).  This 
Article also attempts to find a feasible compromise between granting animal rights and providing an-
imal protections, in order to appease a wider range of animal advocates.  See infra Part V. 
 217. See, e.g., Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture Act, Pub. L. No. 116-72, 133 Stat. 1151 
(2019) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 48); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-247 (2019); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§§ 5531, 5532, 5534, 5540 (2018); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 167.315, 167.320, 167.322, 167.325, 167.330, 
167.340, 167.349 (2017).  For comprehensive compendiums containing the general animal protection 
and related statutes in each state see 2018 U.S. Animal Protection Laws State Rankings, supra note 
144. 
 218. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-247(b) (2019); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5536, 5538, 5542, 
5553, 5560, 5561 (2018); 63 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 485.32(4) (West 2019); OR. REV. 
STAT. §§ 167.315, 167.320, 167.332, 167.335 (2017). 
 219. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6411(e) (2018) (defining a domestic pet broadly as “any do-
mesticated animal which is kept for pleasure rather than utility”), with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, 
§ 3907(22-B) (West 2018) (defining a pet more narrowly as “a dog, cat, or other domesticated animal 
commonly kept as a companion, but does not include tamed animals that are ordinarily considered 
wild animals or livestock”). 
 220. See Animal Advocacy and Causes of Action, supra note 6, at 93. 
 221. See 2018 U.S. Animal Protection Laws State Rankings, supra note 144.  Almost all of the states 
impose a statute of limitations encompassing the range of two to four years.  Id.  Seven states do not 
impose a statute of limitations for felony animal cruelty violations.  Id.  See generally Charging Con-
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should be immune from civil or criminal liability for reporting suspected vio-
lations of this statute.222  Similarly, civilians who remove unattended pet ani-
mals from a vehicle, in certain circumstances, should be immune from civil 
or criminal liability.223  A defendant convicted of a misdemeanor or felony 
violation would forfeit his or her animal(s) and would be prohibited from pos-
sessing an animal for five to fifteen years.224  Lastly, any animal that has been 
abused, neglected, abandoned, or sexually assaulted by a convicted defendant 
would be classified as a victim for purposes of civil liability.225 
B. Civil Action Provision 
The Proposed Animal Protection Bill should include a civil action provi-
sion that will allow humane societies to employ humane officers, similar to 
Pennsylvania’s HLEOs.226  In order to employ a humane officer, a humane 
society must be a nonprofit organization that is formed to prevent cruelty to 
animals.227  A humane officer should be trained, at the expense of the officer 
or the humane society, in acceptable animal practices and investigative pro-
cedures.228  The Pennsylvania HLEOs’ lack of legal training has proven to be 
somewhat of an issue within the state’s system; therefore, contrary to Penn-
sylvania’s HLEOs, under the Proposed Bill humane officers would not have 
 
siderations in Criminal Animal Abuse Cases, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, https://aldf.org/arti-
cle/charging-considerations-in-criminal-animal-abuse-cases/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2019). 
 222. See Laws in Favor of Veterinary Reporting of Animal Cruelty, 2018 U.S. Animal Protection 
Laws State Rankings, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, https://aldf.org/project/2018-veterinary-reporting/ 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2019).  As of 2018, forty-nine states either require or permit veterinarians to report 
suspected animal cruelty and generally grant civil immunity for reporting.  Id.  In stark contrast, Ken-
tucky prohibits veterinarians from reporting suspected abuse.  Id. 
 223. See Acts Against Leaving Dogs Locked in Hot Cars, 2018 U.S. Animal Protection Laws State 
Rankings, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, https://aldf.org/project/2018-dogs-in-hot-cars/ (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2019).  As of 2018, thirty states and the District of Columbia have provisions related to leaving 
animals in a motor vehicle.  Id.  Twenty states provide immunity for law enforcement or animal control 
officers, or first responders who rescue an animal from a vehicle.  Id.  Fourteen states also provide 
immunity for civilians who rescue an animal from a vehicle, under certain circumstances.  Id. 
 224. See Laws Supporting Post-Conviction Possession Bans, 2018 U.S. Animal Protection Laws 
State Rankings, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, https://aldf.org/project/2018-post-conviction-possession-
ban/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2019).  As of 2018, thirteen states require a mandatory ban on possession of 
certain animals after an animal cruelty conviction, and twenty-three states authorize a ban, but leave 
the decision to the court’s discretion.  Id. 
 225. See infra Section V.D. 
 226. See supra Section IV.B. 
 227. See, e.g., 22 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3702 (2018). 
 228. See, e.g., 22 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3712 (2018). 
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the authority to prosecute abusers.229  General law enforcement procedures 
dictate that the police officers respond to and investigate crimes before hand-
ing the evidence to the District Attorney’s office to prosecute a violator.230  
Similarly, under the Proposed Bill, humane officers should respond to and 
investigate instances of animal cruelty and provide evidence to the animal ad-
vocate to prosecute the violator.231 
C. Animal Advocate Provision 
The Proposed Animal Protection Bill should include an animal advocate 
provision, combining the duties removed from the humane officer position 
with those duties granted to Connecticut’s animal advocates, in any case 
brought under the Proposed Bill.232  A federal department should maintain a 
list of approved animal advocates who may prosecute the cases investigated 
by humane officers, or who can be appointed when a court deems necessary 
or upon request of a party.233  An animal advocate must be a bar-admitted 
attorney in any state or a law student working under the supervision of an 
attorney.234  Contrary to the Connecticut advocates, who merely provide as-
sistance to the court and district attorneys,235 the advocates under the Proposed 
Bill would work alongside a humane officer to build a case against the de-
fendant, prosecute the case as a private attorney general, and present infor-
mation or recommendations regarding sentencing to the court.236  Similar to 
the Connecticut advocates, however, the advocates should act in the interests 
of justice.237  When a defendant is convicted of misdemeanor or felony, the 
advocate may continue to represent the mistreated animal in a civil suit against 
 
 229. See supra note 182; see also Anderson, supra note 177, at 60 (revealing an insider account of 
the training of a humane society police officer in Pennsylvania). 
 230. See Symposium, Legal Standing for Animals and Advocates, 13 ANIMAL L. 61, 73 (2006). 
 231. See infra Section V.C. 
 232. See supra Sections IV.A–B, V.B. 
 233. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86n(c) (2019). 
 234. Id. 
 235. See supra notes 161–68 and accompanying text. 
 236. See Legal Standing for Animals and Advocates, supra note 230, at 64. 
 237. See supra notes 166–67 and accompanying text.  Requiring the animal advocates to act in the 
interest of justice distinguishes animal advocates from children’s advocates and combats a perceived 
slippery slope argument by providing an explicit difference in animal treatment compared to human 
treatment.  See Halpern, supra note 167. 
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the abuser.238 
D. Animal-Suit Provision 
Through an animal-suit provision, the Proposed Animal Protection Bill 
should grant animal victims a private right of action to sue their abusers, who 
have been convicted of violating the Bill.239  First, by limiting this grant to 
only the class of animals a court deems to be a victim of a crime prohibited 
by the Proposed Animal Protection Bill, the animal-suit provision is clear and 
precise enough to be upheld according to the Lujan standard.240  Because the 
abuser has already been convicted, there is no doubt that the injury in question 
will be sufficiently actual, concrete, and particularized.241  Second, the re-
quirement of a causal connection between the injured party and the challenged 
action of the defendant is also satisfied because the animal victim may only 
bring a cause of action against its convicted abuser.242  The animal-suit provi-
sion is an explicit Congressional grant of a private right of action, but the 
Proposed Bill should be written in a way that also adheres to Justice Scalia’s 
Lujan test; therefore, even if a court denies the private right of action, the 
animals will continue to satisfy the stricter injury-in-fact test.243  Thus, the 
abused animals themselves will have standing in federal court to sue their 
abusers.244 
The animal-suit provision must also explicitly allow the animal advocates 
to act on behalf of the animal victim, according to Rule 17(c) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.245  Rule 17(c), through “next friend” representation, 
provides a mechanism for representing a party who cannot speak for him or 
 
 238. See infra Section V.D. 
 239. See supra Section IV.C for a discussion regarding a victimized horse, Justice, suing his abuser. 
 240. Burke, supra note 111, at 651 (“The provision need only define the qualifying animals . . . and 
relate them to the injuries protected . . . .”). 
 241. See Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“First, the plaintiff must have suffered 
an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particular-
ized . . . and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” (footnote omitted) (citations 
omitted)). 
 242. Burke, supra note 111, at 651. 
 243. See id.; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
 244. See Burke, supra note 111. 
 245. See id. at 652–53. 
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herself.246  In Whitmore v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court determined two re-
quirements for “next friend” standing: (1) “an adequate explanation—such as 
inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability—why the real party 
in interest cannot appear on his own behalf,” and (2) “the ‘next friend’ must 
be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks 
to litigate.”247  For obvious reasons, an animal cannot appear in court on his 
own behalf; therefore, the first requirement is satisfied.  In order to ensure the 
second requirement is also satisfied, the next friend must be an animal advo-
cate who adheres to the requirements of the animal advocate provision.248  As 
seen in Oregon’s Justice case, any awarded damages should be deposited into 
a trust—of which the animal will be the sole beneficiary—in order to provide 
for medical and rehoming costs.249 
The combination of provisions within the Proposed Animal Protection 
Bill would provide necessary standardized protections for animals to parallel 
society’s evolving feelings toward animal companions.250  The Bill also im-
plements an important system of remedies for animal victims, which complies 
with judicial requirements, without straining the already overworked law en-
forcement and prosecutorial agencies.251 
  
 
 246. Id. at 653. 
 247. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163 (1990). 
 248. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
 249. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.  Employing a trust for the animal-beneficiary dis-
courages abuse within the system and ensures that any damages awarded will be spent on costs of care 
and well-being for the animal-victim.  See, e.g., Justice Complaint, supra note 1, at 6 (revealing how 
Justice will use the money deposited in the trust). 
 250. See supra Part II for a discussion regarding Americans’ evolving feelings toward companion 
animals. 
 251. See, e.g., Animal Advocacy and Causes of Action, supra note 6, at 92–95; Legal Standing for 
Animals and Advocates, supra note 230, at 63–65. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Across the country, animal protection statutes are ineffective.252  Cur-
rently, the duty to protect animals is generally borne by each state, and many 
of them cannot commit to the task.253  Animal shelters, humane societies, and 
animal rescues—who pick up the state’s slack—are often overflowing with 
animals who have been thrown away.254  Yet somehow, at the same time, 
Americans are showing more empathy and care for animals than ever be-
fore.255  Organizations like the Nonhuman Rights Project and the Animal Le-
gal Defense Fund expose this paradox by bringing extreme cases into the pub-
lic eye.256  The legal organizations are not merely shining a light on animal 
abuse and cruelty; they are presenting creative solutions to a generation that 
thrives on knocking down walls and thinking outside of the box.257  This Ar-
ticle attempts to build on their momentum by presenting another creative so-
lution and triggering further discussion within this growing area of law.258 
The Proposed Animal Protection Bill explores animal advocacy move-
ments and current legal restrictions to develop a viable compromise that grants 
animals limited standing to remedy their injuries but maintains the distinction 
between an animal and a legal person.259  Although this may be an underde-
veloped framework, the basic premises are gathered from state systems which 
can (and should) be monitored and adjusted to ensure efficient and effective 
animal protections.260  A federal system, which standardizes protections and 
encourages cooperation with states, humane societies, and effective animal 
 
 252. See Justin Marceau, How the Animal Welfare Act Harms Animals, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 925 
(2018); Karin Brulliard, USDA’s Enforcement of Animal Welfare Laws Plummeted in 2018, Agency 
Figures Show, WASH. POST. (Oct. 18, 2018, 8:12 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/ 
2018/10/18/usdas-enforcement-animal-welfare-laws-plummeted-agency-figures-show/?utm_term=.f 
a98427d7ca7. 
 253. See supra Part IV; see also Jordan Fenster, Animal Cruelty Laws Are Ineffective and Outdated, 
Advocates Say, LOHUD (Feb. 1, 2018 6:00 AM), https://www.lohud.com/story/news/local/2018/02/01/ 
animal-cruelty-laws-ineffective/1083847001/ (“Animal abuse and cruelty laws are hidden away in an 
obscure section of New York’s legal framework . . . making enforcement and prosecution difficult 
prospects.”). 
 254. The Pet Overpopulation and Overflowing Shelter Problem, ANIMAL MED. CTR. OF S. CAL., 
https://animalmedcenter.com/pet-overpopulation/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2019). 
 255. See supra Part II. 
 256. See supra Sections III.B.1, IV.C. 
 257. See supra Sections III.B.1, IV.C. 
 258. See supra Part V. 
 259. See supra Parts II, III, V. 
 260. See supra Part IV. 
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